Introduction
The distinguished BBC producer Grace Wyndham Goldie has recounted how, in late 1945 or early 1946, she began planning a new radio series, The Challenge of Our Time. In the aftermath of a convulsive world war, the times called for serious analysis -which the series would attempt. She asked a range of British intellectuals what issues should be tackled in the series (Goldie 11) . To her surprise, instead of the miscellany of proposals she expected, one dominated: 'the lack of synthesis in modern thinking, and in particular the wide gulf between the scientific and the humanistic approach to life' (Goldie 12) . The Challenge of Our Time was broadcast in spring 1946, and featured philosophers, scientists, historians, divines and others. Science was a recurring theme, with high-profile left-wing scientists J. D. Bernal, J. B. S. Haldane and C. H. Waddington speaking of science's role in creating a rational and fairer society, and other speakers -including the chemist Michael Polanyi -taking more sceptical line. (41) (42) (43) (44) (45) (46) (47) (48) (49) (50) (56) (57) (58) (59) (60) (61) . Listening figures were between three and five million -high for serious talks -and by popular demand the series was published as a book .
It is not difficult to see why 'science and society' touched a nerve at this time. The Second World War was widely understood to have been a scientific war, in which science had been instrumental in overcoming a foe frequently portrayed as irrational and anti-scientific. Yet the closing days of the war had seen the devastating first uses of atomic bombs. The problematic standing of science after the war led some 'public' scientists to temper their former whole hearted advocacy of science. Physiologist Henry Dale, for example, who at a scientific conference in 1943 had spoken of science's central place in modern life (Dale Science and the Citizen 285-6), had, by 1950, adopted a more nuanced view. Now, according to Dale, writing in a BBC publication, science must be everyone's concern because of its potential for 'catastrophic misuse' (Science and Broadcasting 137). Dale plays a major part in the events narrated below.
The above story not only serves as background to this article, which concerns a debate about science broadcasting in the UK in late 1940s and early 1950s, but also shows how historians of broadcasting might find in science broadcasting a useful window on to wider cultural and social issues. For science has in general formed a significant part of BBC output -despite scientists' perpetual complaints about its paucity in broadcasting. (An example of scientists' underestimation of the extent of science broadcasting occurs in the following narrative.)
Although the BBC has not neglected science, historians and commentators on broadcasting have. The standard histories by Asa Briggs, Burton Paulu, and Paddy Scannell and David Cardiff have, at most, odd sentences or paragraphs alluding to science, and no specialist monograph has appeared on the subject. Similarly, the considerable body of book-length memoirs published by former BBC staff has virtually nothing to say about science.
1 Away from the field of media history, however, sociological studies of science in all the media have proliferated in recent decades, especially in relation to the sociological work done by science popularisation to project not just science, but a particularly favourable view of science and scientists. What I should like to see is some break-away from the perpetual theme of 'science and society', with the inevitable excursion of the scientist into fields of politics where he does not shine, towards an attempt to present science as natural philosophy, as a way of life and a culture in its own right. I believe it can be done. I don't think scientists should always appear as Utopian idealists, as Marxists, or as amateur politicians. Cannot we sometimes forget war and atomic weapons, industrial advance or productivity, medicine and food production or science and religion, and say something more of the history and growth of science, of the great revolution wrought by the introduction of the experimental method, of the intellectual satisfaction and fun of science, and of the scope and content of modern science, all regarded as contributions to knowledge rather than as aweinspiring or useful facts?
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The references to 'science and society' broadcasts and to left-wing polemics in Oliphant's letter alluded to broadcasts by politically radical scientists, 4 and quite possibly to Goldie's series The Challenge of Our Time.
Haley took the letter seriously. Oliphant was a respected figure. Australian by birth (and shortly to return to Australia), he had lived in the UK since 1927. During the war, he had worked on the separation of uranium isotopes as part of the atomic bomb projects in the UK and USA. At the time of his letter, Oliphant was a member of the BBC's General Advisory Council, a non-executive body largely comprising eminent figures from public life. The Council had been reconstituted in 1947, following wartime abeyance, with a more diverse membership, and now included seven scientifically trained members in its complement of 49 (Boon 187 The intention behind Trenaman's research at the time of the Anderson Committee was to improve the effectiveness of further educational broadcasts, and, in the case of science broadcasts, to shed some light on the efficacy of spoken science presentation. 13 Further education had been a major plank of pre-war BBC broadcasting policy, when it had been strongly oriented towards 'group listening'. This policy, though, was regarded as a failure by the time of the events covered in this article, and an attempt was under way to revive further education through the creation of a new department, and through Trenaman's investigations of listeners' comprehension. Advocacy of this new approach to further education became part of the BBC's evidence in 1949 to the Broadcasting Committee, chaired by William Beveridge.
14 In the first of Trenaman's science-broadcast experiments in 1949, a recording of a 15-minute talk on electrons was played to 264 listeners of mixed educational qualifications gathered in a studio. 15 Immediately after the programme, listeners wrote down everything they could recollect, and their answers were marked against a list of thirty-three 'teaching points' distilled from lists of teaching points prepared independently by three 'education officials' (Trenaman Understanding 174) . Listeners' scores were taken to indicate comprehension.
The results of the experiment were presented in Figure 1 . The horizontal axis shows categories of listener according to their highest educational attainment. Scores in each category were averaged, hence the label on the vertical axis 'Average group score'. The graph line, rising from left to right, shows that students with high educational attainments understood the talk better on average than students with low educational attainments. A score of 15 was set as the limit of understanding, and groups whose average score was below 15 were considered not to have understood the talk. This threshold of 15 marks was determined by giving identical sets of 20 marked scripts to each of five science teachers. The scripts covered the range of marks from low to high, but the marks were hidden. The science teachers were asked sort them into five grades, the top being 'a sufficient understanding of the whole of the talk,' and the bottom 'little or no understanding of the important points of the talk.' The middle grade, 'a sufficient understanding of only a few of the important points,' was taken as the threshold, and found to correspond to a mark of 15. In other experiments the threshold corresponded to a different mark (Trenaman Understanding 175) . The surprising result of the experiment, however, was not the findings on comprehension, but on interest. Discussions between listeners and experimentalists revealed that listeners' interest in the broadcast was not correlated with their comprehension. Three distinct levels of interest were found, broadly associated with educational attainment. These interest levels are shown as hatched columns in Figure  1 . The greatest interest (middle column) coincided with subjects whose average score was on the limit of understanding -as shown by the intersection of the graph line with the score of 15 (the 'Limit of Understanding').
One of the report's conclusions was that 'the needs of the general public call for spoken word broadcasts in science at three levels of difficulty.' This finding was the most influential part of the report of the experiment. The three levels were felt to correspond approximately to the typical educational attainments of audiences for the three domestic radio channels of the BBC: the Third Programme, Home Service and Light Programme.
Coordination
For much of its history, the BBC has had no Science department. Subject-specific production departments have generally not existed, except for Music and Religion. At the time of the events described here, radio broadcasts on most topics, including science, could emerge principally from three departments:
Talks Department (in Talks Division) Schools Department (in Talks Division) Features Department (in Entertainment Division) 16 Members of the Anderson Committee felt that this spread of departmental responsibility for science was a dispersal of talent, and led to haphazard programming. 17 This issue was referred to as a lack of coordination. As this idea was being discussed within the Committee, a copy of Trenaman's report arrived, with its suggestion that talks should be planned to fit the 'three interests' model. This observation fed into the Anderson Committee's report, which appeared towards the end of November 1949. It congratulated the BBC on the 'impressive volume' of its scientific broadcasting, saying that 7.5% of the time available for Talks was devoted to science. 18 However, it doubted whether there was adequate coordination of science broadcasts to ensure that they had their 'maximum impact on the interest and understanding of listeners at their various levels of knowledge and intelligence' -a reference to Trenaman's experimental findings. 19 The report recommended the experimental appointment of a scientific advisor, whose role would be to improve coordination, as well as to explore programme ideas, investigate new methods of production, and to explore the new potentials offered by television.
The BBC's Board of Governors accepted the report's major recommendation, and set about finding a suitable advisor. However, there were dissenters. One manager (name unrecorded) did not see lack of coordination as a problem:
I do not see how, under the present constitution, there could ever be any adequate machinery for ensuring complete co-ordination of the Corporation's science output. The best we can hope for is that those who are guiding its policy and working out details at least keep in touch with each other so that they know what their other colleagues in this field are doing. I hope I am not being pessimistic in refusing to be distressed by this thought. The range of science today is so vast in relation to the maximum time the Corporation can conceivably devote to it that any really comprehensive scheme seems impossible.
This manager considered that a scientific advisor would not help but hinder -in a way that gives the present article its title:
So far as I can see our relations with the scientists are at the moment excellent and I can only see such an appointment as is envisaged here as clogging the machinery. 
The Henry Dale experiment and report
The experimental 'science adviser' appointed by the BBC was the physiologist and pharmacologist Sir Henry Dale (1875 Dale ( -1968 (Dale Science and Broadcasting) in which he stressed the importance of science, both as a deliverer of material benefits and as a way of thinking. He stressed the dangers of the abuse of knowledge, and the current threats to humanity: annihilation, overpopulation, starvation, and exhaustion of raw materials. Science was thus everybody's concern, and broadcasting had a vital role in fostering an enlightened interest in science. Dale acknowledged that listeners' taste for science had limits, but he suspected the limits had not been seriously tested, pointing out that in his youth very few people had been interested in 'serious' music, but the promotion of music at popular concerts had created a large audience for it. He suggested something similar might be possible with science.
If Dale had hoped that his appointment would allow him to implement some of these ideas, he was to be disappointed. In his report, issued in early 1953, he found that working with BBC producers had been highly enjoyable, and was happy to pay tribute to them; but his role had been frustrating. 24 He had been given no office or secretarial support, and had difficulty discovering plans for forthcoming broadcasts. His natural point of contact within the BBC was Archibald Clow, the principal science producer in the Talks Department. However Clow was already overloaded with work, and Dale could see that his own need for assistance imposed an additional burden on Clow.
After about a year, help was found for Clow, which freed some of his time. Dale drew on it with an easier conscience, but did not regard this a satisfactory solution either for Clow or himself. Dale's lack of facilities was at odds with earlier assurances from George Barnes that '... the responsible Controllers could be relied upon to give [an advisor] adequate scope and effective collaboration.' 25 As far as his coordinating function was concerned, all Dale could do was arrange periodic interdepartmental meetings between producers. Each participant was required to let Dale know beforehand of current and future projects. The participants said the meetings were useful for exchanging information among themselves, but Dale reported that no collaboration between producers in different departments followed. Producers sought Dale's opinion on scripts, but always so late in production that very little emendation was possible. However, Dale approved of the way television was shaping up, and found that he could operate more effectively here than in radio.
It is hard to see Dale's report as anything other than an indication of bad faith on the BBC's part. Mary Somerville, Director of Talks at the time of Dale's report, wrote:
I cannot but regard the circumstances of [Dale's] appointment and our subsequent treatment of him as a somewhat unhappy page in BBC history.
In particular, she considered that the Anderson Committee's recommendation was incompatible with BBC practice, and infringed producers' responsibilities:
Although the BBC accepted the recommendation of the Anderson Committee to appoint a Scientific Adviser I do not think they ever subscribed to the assumptions underlying that recommendation i.e. that it is desirable in principle to co-ordinate BBC output, or approaches to scientists, or that it is necessary for any check to be placed upon producers' choice of speakers by 'establishing high-level contact with scientists on the requisite footing of informality'. 26 Somerville considered that any future Scientific Advisor would have to accept BBC practice rather than change it:
My main recommendation is that if we do appoint another Scientific Adviser his terms of reference should be framed to fit the facts of the situation inside the BBC. Thus the first question seems to me to be -Is a policy of coordinating programmes and approaches now to be adopted or not? 27 No further Scientific Advisor was appointed, and uncoordinated, de-centralised production continued as before. The episode, though, had a rhetorical usefulness for BBC staff. In a public talk in 1966, Aubrey Singer, Head of Outside Broadcasts, Feature and Science Programmes, Television (and originator of the television science series Horizon) rather dubiously claimed (Singer 12):
Previous experience in this field [science broadcasting] had taught us that co-ordination ... did not really work and indeed actively discouraged the interest of production departments.
Discussion
In this section I want to examine and contextualise some of the more striking (and strange) features of the story narrated above.
As has already been mentioned, similar calls on the BBC to coordinate science broadcasts were made in 1943-4, and soundly rebuffed. Between 1958 and 1961, scientists again (and rather more ill-temperedly) called for science broadcasts to be coordinated, and again were rebuffed, although this time the BBC was asked to resolve the issue by the Pilkington Committee. A compromise was adopted -the establishment of the Science Consultative Group, an advisory committee of scientists which had no executive powers (Jones Élite) . In all these interventions scientists argued for science to be privileged because (as scientists claimed) it was intrinsically important in modern life and for the country's economy. In the scientists' view, this obligated the BBC to elevate science in its output, and to give the scientific world greater say in its programming. What is distinctive about the 1949 interventions described here, relative to the earlier and later ones, is that they were received sympathetically by Director General. Possibly timing had a lot to do with this. The 1949 interventions happened when the BBC was under scrutiny by the Broadcasting Committee chaired by William Beveridge, which took an interest in all aspects of the BBC's work including that of its advisory bodies. 28 Haley might therefore have been accommodating towards the General Advisory Council for diplomatic reasons. However, I suggest a different explanation, which is not incompatible with the one just given. The 1949 interventions could be seen as being partly initiated within the BBC, in the sense that external members sat on the General Advisory Council by invitation from the BBC. 29 In 1943-4 and 1958-61 , by contrast, the initiatives came from bodies outside the BBC, principally from the British Association for the Advancement of Science and the Royal Society, and could be construed as institutional threats to the BBC's autonomy.
The story told here shows that Oliphant and the other members of the General Advisory Council, and later the Anderson Committee, had a superficial, and even prejudiced, view of the nature of the BBC's science broadcasts. They erroneously considered the broadcasts to be dominated by instrumental, and politically motivated, portrayals of science, and argued for a view of science as culture, and deserving consideration alongside other cultural practices. The historian Roy Porter has commented on a post-war propensity among scientists to prefer a 'cultural' framing of science: 'In the post-Hiroshima twilight when science had lost its innocence, this [cultural interpretation of science] could be comforting news' (36). Much of Oliphant's war-time work had been connected with the development of atomic weapons, and much of his post-war career with peaceful uses of nuclear power, so his intervention has the hallmarks of the phenomenon identified by Porter.
Joe Trenaman's experimental results were seized on both by scientists and BBC staff members, and it is worth exploring the extent to which Trenaman's methods and results played to the presuppositions of each group. Trenaman's approach had the appearance and trappings of science. It assumed that comprehension was quantifiable, and that laboratory-like conditions enabled it to be isolated and measured. In his book Communication and Comprehension, Trenaman almost fetishised his experimental procedure, as though to establish its scientific merit (14) (15) :
For the sound broadcasts the studio seating was arranged so that each member was usually sitting about two feet from his neighbour. The viewing theatres, where the television versions were seen, were smaller, with tip-up seats in fixed positions, and it was not possible to separate participants to the same extent.
Each respondent was asked to complete three lots of questionnaires stapled in three separate booklets of contrasting colours.
During the playback of the recordings the lights were dimmed for the sound broadcasts and were switched right off for the telerecordings in the hope that members would be less conscious of the presence of the others in the group. They were asked to try to imagine that they were at home.
This 'scientific' approach could be expected to have appealed to scientists, and it is telling that scientific members of the Anderson Committee were 'interested and impressed' by the results of Trenaman's experiment.
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For the broadcasters, Trenaman's conclusion that listeners could be aggregated into three groups on the basis of their academic qualifications provided a 'scientific' rationale for what was already a standard way of stratifying audiences. In 1938, for example, a senior talks assistant wrote in a memorandum that listeners fell into categories: A, B and C. Group A were the 'intelligent and well informed'. Group B were 'intelligent and not so well informed.' Group C, the largest, included the 'not so intelligent and mostly uninformed' who, because of their 'extreme simplicity' would only listen to 'adventure' or 'personality' talks'. 31 In 1943, Mary Somerville also split listeners into three groups:
1 Well informed people who would be interested to hear of new research work [...] 2 Less well educated people who already have the capacity for taking an interest in some science ... without having the training to satisfy their own interest.
3 The uninformed and uneducated man (and woman) in the street who are to be found in all classes of the community and who retard social progress in all departments of life when co-operation depends on the acceptance of scientific principles.
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And Haley himself thought of the public as a three-layer pyramid for which '... we would have a Light Programme which would cover the lower third of the pyramid. We would have a Home Service which would take more than the middle third, take everything up to the tip. And then we'd have a Third Programme. [...]' 33 However, Robert Silvey, a long-term member of BBC staff who pioneered audience research, had a less crude view of audience stratification, for which just as much empirical justification could be claimed as for Trenaman's view. According to , 'highbrow' listeners were distinguished from others by the fact that they listened to, and appreciated, all kinds of material, not simply the kind their educational and cultural backgrounds were thought to predispose them to.
Following the Anderson Committee's 'discovery' that science broadcasts were not as Oliphant had claimed, but were already in the style of his 'new' type of broadcast, it is striking how the Committee's concerns swung round to 'coordination', drawing on the timely appearance of Trenaman's experimental findings. In the mid-to-late 1940s, coordination of output had been a subject of considerable debate and policy shifts within the BBC. In 1945, with a new Third Programme still at the planning stage, a policy of decentralised programme planning was introduced by Haley. The three radio networks were expected to compete with each other, so far as this was possible without compromising their essential characters . This policy brought benefits, but by 1948 was judged too problematic to be allowed to continue. It was rescinded by Haley, who announced that 'constructive and creative planning' was to take the place of competition within and between radio services. The services were to be 'co-ordinated to the fullest possible extent in the listeners' general interest.' 34 The Anderson Committee's interest in 'coordination' was therefore consonant with the recent policy shift towards coordinated production. However, for broadcasters and scientists 'coordination' turned out to mean different things. As Briggs explains, for the broadcasters coordination was related to the efficient use of resources in pursuit of the BBC's cultural mission (Sound 74). For the scientists, coordination meant the efficient use of resources (under the management of a scientist) for the promotion of science. It represented a transfer of responsibility away from BBC staff and towards scientists, and directly challenged the professional competence of production staff. This is not to say that Henry Dale actually aspired to controlling science broadcasts during his experimental appointment; but there was potential for BBC production staff to lose autonomy, and for managerial lines of responsibility to become confused, if the experiment resulted in a permanent post. Against this background, it is no surprise that the experiment was 'a somewhat unhappy page in BBC history'.
Conclusion
Earlier in this article I mentioned the comparative neglect of science in historical studies of broadcasting. This article suggests that a potentially productive way to approach the topic is via the relationship between the BBC and the world of 'élite science' (such as the Royal Society and other influential, high prestige bodies). Within both of these domains there was a somewhat paternalistic orientation towards the public. That is, in both there was a tendency to see the public as needing guidance towards what was beneficial. For the scientists, this meant promoting a particular view of science and its importance to the public, and the transfer to scientists of a greater degree of control over science broadcasting. For the BBC it meant promoting knowledge of a wide range of cultural activities, including science, and the retention of control by the BBC as the guardians of public service broadcasting. In both cases we see a concern with remoulding public tastes on a large scale, which naturally opens possibilities for both cooperation and conflict. In the present case, the cooperation between the BBC and its advisors led to conflict when the possibility of external control and disruption to existing BBC practices became apparent to BBC staff.
